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EX ANTE CHOICE OF JURY WAIVER CLAUSES IN MERGERS
Darius Paliaa,b & Robert E. Scottb`

Abstract
This paper examines empirically why sophisticated parties in some merger and
acquisition deals choose to waive their right to jury trials and some do not. We examine
merger agreements for a large sample of 276 deals for the 11-year period 2001 to 2011.
We exclude private company deals and those where the choice of forum and law is
Delaware. First, we find that 48.2% of the deals have jury waiver clauses. Second, we
find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum state are
more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. Third, we
find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to include
jury waiver clauses, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law firm than for
the target’s law firm. Fourth, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power
hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to
include jury waiver clauses. Finally, we find no evidence that lawyer familiarity,
industry-effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was
completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of having a jury waiver
clause.
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1. Introduction
Legal scholars have long recognized that contracts should maximize the joint
gains or contractual surplus from transactions between parties. In doing so, contracts
should satisfy being ex post trade efficient (trade occurs only when value to the buyer
exceeds value to the seller), and being ex ante investment efficient in the subject matter
of the contract (Schwartz & Scott 2003). Contracting parties can enhance the ex ante
efficiency of their contract by shifting contracting costs between the front end of the
transaction (the negotiation and drafting stage) and the back end (the contract
enforcement and litigation stage) (Scott & Triantis 2006). For example, a clause that
waives the parties’ right to a jury trial should litigation result reduces back end
enforcement costs (by reducing the time and expense of a trial as well as errors made by
inexperienced juries) and transfers corresponding contracting costs to the front end of the
transaction (where the parties must negotiate such an agreement). Theory predicts that
sophisticated parties will agree to such clauses when the savings in expected enforcement
costs exceed the additional costs of negotiation and drafting. Any efficiency gains from
jury waiver clauses would depend, inter alia, on the relative complexity of the contract:
ceteris paribus, the more complex the factual context, the more cost savings might be
realized from a jury waiver.

But jury waiver clauses may also have distributional as well as efficiency effects.
For example, some parties may believe that they have an advantage over others in
persuading a jury rather than a judge of the merits of their claim. 1 This advantage might
be particularly true, for example, for firms located in the forum from which the jury pool
is drawn. As a consequence, a party may resist agreeing to an efficiency enhancing jury
waiver clause if its expected share of any efficiency gains are less than that its expected
gain from exploiting its litigation advantage. Additionally, firms might draft jury waiver
clauses because substantial ex post litigation costs might have to be incurred because
1

This advantage may derive, for example, from the firm’s locational proximity to the jury pool.

2

juries have difficulties interpreting vague terms such as “reasonable best efforts” or
“material adverse changes” which could lead to large errors (Choi & Triantis 2010).

Given the possible offsetting effects of jury waiver clauses in particular contexts,
one would predict that some contracts would contain jury waiver clauses and others
would not. This paper examines the variation in the use of jury waiver clauses in merger
and acquisition agreements. 2 The agreement between target and acquirer firms to waive
the right to a jury is one means of reducing expected litigation costs in large complex
commercial contracts such as merger agreements. In addition to the expected reduction in
litigation costs of having a bench trial rather than a jury trial, data show that many
corporate managers and business lawyers believe that juries increase variance in trial
outcomes because jurors do not fully take into account the evidence and applicable law
(Lande 1998). Juries are also often been viewed as less technically sophisticated and
legally knowledgeable than judges, and are believed to be often swayed by extrinsic
factors that can lead to larger errors and arbitrary awards. 3
This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals 4 over an 11-year
period (2001 to 2011) to determine the factors that explain the ex ante choice to include a
jury waiver clause in a merger and acquisition deal. In an interesting inaugural study,
Eisenberg and Miller (EM) examined jury trial waivers for 11 different types of
commercial contracts for the six month period January 2002 to June 2002 (Eisenberg &

2

For an excellent explanation of other merger and acquisition contract characteristics, see Coates, 2015.

3

For example, jurors might suffer more from behavioral cognitive biases (Sunstein et. al, 2002); Ellsworth,
1993); Lebine & Lebine1996); Jurors might also make moral judgments about the conduct of particular
parties and the size of the requested damages award (Sunstein et al, 2002), (Chapman & Bornsetin, 1996).
Jurors might also be affected by the appearance of the parties and personality of the lawyers (Harris, et al
2006), (MacCoun, 1990). Juries might also place too much emphasis on expert testimony and when the
expert testifies in more technical terms (Raitz, et al.1990), (Horowitz, et al. 2001).
4

Publicly traded deals are defined as those where both the acquirer and the target firm are traded in U.S.
capital markets.

3

Miller 2007). 5 EM found that jury trial waivers were more likely with greater contract
standardization, perceived fairness of juries, and by contract type. In their conclusion,
EM state:
We are mindful … this is the first study of its kind and it is important to recognize
its limitations. The contracts we study exist in a narrow time period. Ideally, we
would like information for periods before and after the first half of 2002. The
variation across contract types in the rates of jury trial waiver also suggests that
more information and more sophisticated modeling of the decision to include
waivers would be fruitful. The details of the relations between the contracting
parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses should be studied. 6

We address EM’s concerns and extend their study by a) examining a large sample
that starts in January 2001 and ends in December 2011; b) analyzing merger agreements
only, 7 in order to overcome the heterogeneity problem in the EM study; 8 c) analyzing
new hypotheses relating jury waiver clauses to the parties’ choice of governing law and
choice of forum as well as characteristics of law firms representing both bidder and target
firms (namely, their reputation and familiarity with each other); and d) analyzing whether
bargaining power is related to the probability of a jury waiver clause in the agreement. In
doing so, we exclude all mergers that chose Delaware as their state of governing law and
forum, given that the Delaware Chancery Court sits always without a jury. We also

5

6

For mergers their sample ended in July 2002.
Id at 586-87.

7

Merger contracts are highly negotiated, involve sophisticated parties, deal with large and material
amounts, and are very enforceable. Litigation in this context is likely to be standardized about deal price,
with litigation consisting of derivative suits involving whether the deal price is too high or too low, and
whether the acquirer did not ‘close on the deal’.

8

The contracts in the Eisenberg and Miller (2007) study include agreements involving asset sales, bond
indentures, credit commitments, employment, licensing, pooling and servicing, settlements, mergers and
underwriting. There is too much heterogeneity in these types of contracts to be captured by dummy
variables for each contract type.

4

ensure that our results are not driven by five other states that have similar Chancery
courts, namely, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee.

We find the following results. First, we find that jury waiver clauses are quite
ubiquitous in merger and acquisition deals as 48.2% of them have jury waiver clauses. 9
Second, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum
state are more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect.
Third, we find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to
include jury waiver clauses,

10

and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law

firm than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining
power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely
to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that
lawyer familiarity, industry effects whether the acquirer was an international firm, or
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of
having a jury waiver clause.

It is important to note that our results are based on correlations between
quantifiable variables using Probit regression analysis. In no way are we attributing our
results to some form of causal claim. In order to do so, we need to identify an exogenous
shock that was not expected by the various participants in the merger and acquisitions
market place. Clearly, the choice of attorney, choice of jury waiver clause, choice of
forum and law clause are endogenously determined. It is extremely hard, and one might
also say close to impossible, to identify natural exogenous events which effect one choice

9

Using a larger sample, we find that jury waiver clauses correlate with higher announcement period stock
returns for both the target and the combined firm (Palia & Robert E. Scott, 2014). The result that jury
waiver clauses are beneficial and Pareto efficient for the combined firms is consistent with Eisenberg et. al,
2006, and Eisenberg & Wells, 2006).

10

Data supports that including jury waiver clauses increase the value of the deal, see note 9 supra.
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variable and not another choice variable. That said, our empirical approach is consistent
with all other studies that examine mergers and acquisitions using regression analysis.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our hypotheses and Section 3
describes our data, empirical methodology, and variables. Our empirical results are
reported in Section 4, and conclusions presented in Section 5.

2. Hypotheses
In this section we construct hypotheses that correlate with the probability of the
merger deal having a jury waiver clause.

2.1 Choice of Forum and Choice of Law
Merging firms that choose a state for dispute resolution opt into a judicial system,
a cohort of judges and a jury pool. They accomplish this by negotiating a choice of forum
clause. If the merging firms believe a state’s judges are experienced and knowledgeable
when compared to other states, they will tend to choose that state as the forum for any
litigation over the contract and will more likely negotiate for a jury waiver clause.
Additionally, if the merging firms believe that the chosen state’s jury pool is fair and
balanced, as compared to other states they will be less likely to negotiate a jury waiver
(Eisenberg & Miller 2007a, Cain & Davidoff 2012).

The choice of using a jury rather than a judge to decide the facts may be
influenced by the extent to which the jury will be required to evaluate evidence of the
meaning of the agreement from sources extrinsic to the written agreement. Here the
choice of forum can also implicate the parties’ option to choose the rules of contract
interpretation that will govern contract disputes. A choice of law clause in a merger
agreement is typically paired with the choice of forum provision in a single contract term
that designates the same state as the exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes as well as the

6

source of governing law. 11 Choices of law clauses permit parties to select either
“textualist” or “contextualist” rules of interpretation. Textualist jurisdictions, such as
New York, use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to
merger or integration clauses, and, in their absence, presume that the contract is fully
integrated if it appears final and complete on its face. 12 In the same spirit, the textualist
approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to impart non-standard
meaning to language that, read alone, is unambiguous. 13 From the textualist perspective,
therefore, the parol evidence and plain meaning rules are tools with which the contracting
parties can control the evidence courts will use to interpret the portion of their agreement
that they intend to make legally enforceable. Contextualist jurisdictions, such as
California, 14 reject the notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—
context free—meaning at all. By the same logic they favor a soft parol evidence rule.
Here the test for integration admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous
merger clause declaring the contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause,
11

The typical merger agreement contains both choice of forum and choice of law provisions, most often
combined in a single contract term. See e.g. Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization among
Chordiant Software, Inc., Puccini Acquisition Corp., and Prime Response, Inc. , January 8, 2001.
9.5 Applicable Law: Jurisdiction. This agreement shall be governed by, and construed in
accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware, regardless of the laws that might otherwise
govern under applicable principles of conflicts of laws thereof. In any action between any of the
parties arising out of or relating to the Agreement: (a) each of the parties irrevocably and
unconditionally consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state and
federal courts located in the state of Delaware…
A random search in our sample of merger agreements yielded only five agreements where the choice of
forum and choice of law terms appeared as separate terms of the contract. In each of the five cases, the
agreements identified the same state as the forum state and the source of governing law.
12

See, e.g., Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) (“Parol
evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract containing a merger clause.”)

13

The plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning should be attributed to the contract
terms that the parol evidence rule has identified. As with the division over hard and soft parol evidence
rules, courts have divided on the question whether express contract terms should be given a contextual or a
plain meaning interpretation. Under the latter practice, when words or phrases appear to be unambiguous,
extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is inadmissible (Schwartz & Scott 2010).
14

Other states that have contextualist jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Michigan, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Texas, Vermont and Washington.

7

notwithstanding the fact that the writing appears final and complete on its face. 15 Courts
in California regard the merger clause as merely creating a rebuttable presumption of
integration that can be overridden by extrinsic evidence that the parties lacked any such
intent.
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses vary with the forum state and with the choice of law
for contract interpretation.

2.2 Attorney familiarity
If attorneys for both the target and acquirer firm are from the same state, they
might be more familiar with relevant state law and with each other. As a consequence of
the pre-existing relationship of their representatives, the merging firms may be less likely
to litigate their disagreements and more likely to settle (Klausner 1995, Kahan & Klausner
1997, Johnston & Waldfogel 2002). Settlement may be easier to achieve in a bench trial

rather than a jury trial as the variance in the parties’ estimation of their case is smaller in
the former case.

Hypothesis 2: Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the
attorneys are from the same state.

Additionally, it seems reasonable that local attorneys might expect a local jury to
favor it over non-local counterparties. For example, an attorney from the same state as the
where the firm is headquartered might prefer a jury from that state for beneficial jurisdiction
over a non-local attorney.

Hypothesis 2.2(b): Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the
attorneys and the firm’s headquarters are from the same state.

15

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (1968)
(“[R]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered
to prove the intention of the parties.”)

8

2.3 Attorney reputation
Attorneys associated in a law firm with a high reputation for legal skill and
experience are likely to be more confident in their ability to negotiate merger deals that
are favorable to their clients’ interests. To protect the advantage that they anticipate
being able to secure in negotiating the terms of the merger agreement, they would prefer
to have the case litigated before a judge rather than a jury.

A judge’s superior

understanding of legal issues increases the probability that any advantage gained through
negotiating a (clearly written) agreement would be sustained in court. As noted above,
juries increase the variance in outcomes and in making significantly costly errors thus
reducing marginally any advantage secured in the merger negotiations. Additionally,
more skilled and experienced attorneys are also more likely to be familiar with the
jurisdictional divide between textualist and contextualist styles of contract interpretation
and as a consequence cognizant of the expected efficiency gains from choosing to litigate
in a textualist state. Both of these theories would present similarly in the desire to
negotiate a jury waiver clause. 16

Hypothesis 2.3: Jury waiver clauses will increase with law firm reputation.

16

Some papers have shown that lawyer reputation is important. In a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game, Gilson & Mnookin, 1994 suggest that clients can use lawyers with strong reputation to credibly
signal to the other side that they are cooperative; in an experimental setting, Croson and Mnookin, 1997
finds supporting evidence that principals will choose agents that sustain more cooperation than on their
own; Gilson, 1984 suggests that business lawyers create value by being transaction cost engineers that
increase the market value of their clients’ transactions; Okamoto, 1995 suggests that law firm reputation is
a credible bond or commitment device in the form of a legal opinion being made on behalf of the client
firm; Krishnan & Masulis, 2013 find that top law firms increase the takeover premium for their client firms,
top bidder law firms have higher completion rates and top target law firms have higher withdrawal rates;
Coates 2012), finds that law firms with more M&A experience but less private target firm experience are
less likely to choose Delaware as the forum for dispute resolution, whereas firm with less M&A experience
omit forum selection clauses; and Krishnan, et al, 2013 find that top law firms representing both bidders
and targets increase the probability of shareholder litigation.

9

One might argue that transactional attorneys who are in partnership with high
reputation litigation specialists might be confident of their colleagues’ superior ability
relative to opposing counsel to persuade a jury pool of the merits of their claim and
would therefore prefer litigating in front of a jury. But this argument is likely to be
unsupported by the facts because jury waiver clauses are designed by the merger
transaction lawyer and not by the litigation specialist (who is brought into the deal only if
there is a conflict between parties). 17

2.4 Bargaining power
Contracts are often based on the bargaining power of the parties involved. If both
the acquirer and the target firm are of the same size they might a priori believe that they
have been fairly represented in merger negotiations. On the other hand, if for example,
the acquirer is of a larger size and consequently has greater bargaining power, such
acquirers might insists that the smaller target firm waive its right to a jury trial.

Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will be more frequent when the bidding firm is of a
much larger size than the target firm.

2.5 International acquiring firms
Some studies have found that international firms prefer arbitration to litigation
(Eisenberg & Miller 2007b). To the extent that this preference reflects a reluctance to rely
on non-expert juries to resolve commercial disputes, the fact that the acquiring firm is
unfamiliar with and uneasy about relying on U.S. juries should be positively correlated
with the frequency of jury waiver clauses in the merger agreement.

17

Additionally, the Vault litigation and merger rankings are given for only for a small sample of law firms.
For example, litigation rankings are given for only five law firms, the merger rankings for 10 law firms,
whereas the overall ranking was for 100 law firms.

10

Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will be more frequent when the bidding firm is an
international acquirer that is traded in the U.S. capital markets.

3. Data, Methodology, and Variables
3.1 Data
We begin creating our sample of merger and acquisition deals by examining
Thomson Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Domestic Merger Database from January
2000 through December 2011. This resulted in 109,098 observations. We dropped any
transactions where we could not obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). This resulted in an initial sample of 8,488 observations. We then
dropped transactions wherein the target company’s name was the same as the acquirer
company’s name as in the case of exchange offers between two classes of stock and stock
buybacks (6,681 observations), if the transaction did not involve a merger as in equity
carve outs, loan modifications and recapitalization (281 observations), if we could not
find a merger agreement filed as an exhibit in SEC Form 8-K filing from the SEC’s
Edgar database (351 observations) and where market value could not be calculated from
CRSP before the merger due to missing data (28 observations). 18 Because we did not
want our results to being driven by mergers that chose Delaware as the state of forum we
removed such mergers (603 observations). Our final sample for analysis consists of 276
observations. A summary of our data collection methodology is given in Table 1.

***Table 1***

3.2 Definitions and sources for variables
Our dependent variable is if the deal had a jury waiver clause, or not. We
manually examined merger agreements to collect this variable. We also collected data
from the merger agreements on whether the deal had an arbitration clause. There were
18

We could not determine why some deals had no merger agreements filed with Edgar.
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very few mergers with arbitration clauses (seven mergers), so we categorized is it as a
jury waiver clause. 19

We describe below the definition, construction and data source for the various
independent variables used in our regression (see Table 2 for a summary). We examined
the merger agreements for choice of forum and choice of law. If the merger agreement
gave New York as the choice of forum and law we set a dummy variable Forum-NY to
unity, and zero otherwise. If the merger agreement gave the following 10 states (namely,
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas,
Vermont and Washington) as the choice of forum and law, we set a dummy variable
Forum-restrictive to unity, and zero otherwise. For deals in which the choice of forum
and law are for states that are not from the above 11 states, we set the dummy variables
Forum-NY, and Forum-restrictive to zero.

***Table 2***

In order to get proxy variables for the acquirers and bidders law firm reputation,
we use three definitions of law firm reputation. The first proxy variable for law firm
reputation is based on the idea that more reputable lawyers can charge higher fees.
Accordingly, we use as our independent variable the dollar profits per partner for the top
200 law firms. This data is obtained for each year from the Am Law 200 series provided
by ALM Legal Intelligence. We define A_reputation_PPP as the law firm rank based on
profits per partner (in $millions) for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Similarly, we define
T_reputation_PPP as the law firm rank based on profits per partner (in $millions) for the
target firm’s lawyer. If the law firm is not listed in the top 200, we give it a rank 201.20

19

None of our results significantly change if we removed these mergers from our analysis.
When the rank of the bidder’s or the target’s law firm was not listed in the top 100, we also set dummy
variables equal to unity, and A_reputation_Vault and T_reputation_Vault to zero. Our results did not
significantly change, suggesting that law firm rank of the non-listed firm is not driving our law firm
reputation results.
20

12

Note that a lower number for both A_reputation_PPP and/or T_reputation_PPP indicates
a more reputable law firm.

Our second proxy variable for law firm reputation is the prestige rank of the law
firm by Vault. The top 100 law firms are ranked by Vault each year. We define
A_reputation_Vault (T_reputation_Vault), as the law firm rank based on Vault for the
acquiring (target) firm’s lawyer, respectively. If the law firm is not listed in the top 100,
we give it a rank 101. Our third proxy variable for law firm reputation, is
A_reputation_NY, and is a dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s lawyer is
from New York. A similar variable, T_reputation_NY is set to unity if the target firm’s
lawyer is from New York.

To examine the attorney familiarity hypothesis, we examined the merger
agreements and created a dummy variable Lawyer-familiarity, if attorneys for both the
target and acquirer are from the same state, and zero otherwise. To examine if an
attorney from the same state as the where the firm is headquartered might prefer a jury
from that state for beneficial jurisdiction over a non-local attorney, we create two dummy
variables. The first dummy variable, A_HQ-lawyer familiarity, is set to unity if the
acquiring firm’s headquarters and their attorney is from the same state, and zero
otherwise. The second dummy variable, T_HQ-lawyer familiarity, is set to unity if the
target firm’s headquarters and their attorney is from the same state, and zero otherwise.

To examine the bargaining power hypothesis, we need to calculate the relative
size of the merging firms. In order to calculate this variable, we define the variable
Relative size to be the natural logarithm of the market value of the target firm less the
natural logarithm of the market value of the bidder firm. These market values are
calculated from CRSP on the last day of the estimation period (t =-60). 21
21

This methodology has also been used by Asquith, et al 1983.
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We define a dummy variable A_international which is set to unity if SDC states
that the acquirer is an international bidder. For US bidders A_international is set to zero.
We also include a number of control variables. The first is a dummy variable, Completed,
that is set to unity if the deal was completed, and zero otherwise. We also include 18
dummy variables, nine for acquirers and nine for target firms to control for the industry
of each firm. We use the firm’s four-digit SIC code to map into the 10 Fama-French
industries. 22 The nine dummy variables for acquirers are: A_cons_nondur which is set to
unity for consumer nondurables (food, tobacco, textiles apparel, leather and toys), and
zero otherwise; A_cons_dur which set to unity for consumer durables (cars, tv’s, furniture,
household appliances), and zero otherwise; A_manuf which is set to unity for
manufacturing industries, and zero otherwise; A_energy which is set to unity for the oil,
gas and coal industries, and zero otherwise; A_high_tech which is set to unity for high
technology companies, and zero otherwise; Telecom which is set to unity for the
television and transmission industries, and zero otherwise; A_shops which is set to unity
for wholesale and retail shops, and zero otherwise; A_health which is set to unity for the
healthcare industry, and zero otherwise; and A_utilities which is set to unity for the
utilities industry, and zero otherwise. All other industries are set to zero in the above nine
industry variables. A similar algorithm is implemented for target industries, with each
industry name beginning with T_ instead.

4. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We begin by documenting the incidence of jury waiver and arbitration clauses in
our sample. We find that jury waiver clauses are quite ubiquitous in the merger
agreements, with 133 out of 276 (48.2%) having a jury waiver clause. In Table 3, we
present the descriptive statistics of the independent variables that we will use in our
regression.
22
See industry classification definitions at Professor Kenneth French’s web site http://mba.tuck.Dartmouth
.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html.

14

***Table 3***

We find that the choice of New York as the state of law and forum to be 25% (68
mergers out of 276) in our sample, and the 10 restrictive states that allow contextual
interpretation to be 17% (47 mergers out of 276). We also find that the acquiring (target)
firm’s lawyers to have an average rank based on profits per partner of 101.9 (115.3),
respectively, out of a maximum rank of 201. Similarly, we find that the acquiring (target)
firm’s lawyers to have an average rank based on Vault of 63.9 (69.1), respectively, out of
a maximum rank of 101. New York based law firms are on average more heavily
represented for acquirers (31%) than for target firms (18%).

We find that 32% or 88 out of 276 mergers have lawyers from the same state,
with the median mergers having lawyers from different states. 84% of the mergers have
the lawyer of the acquiring firm from the same state as where the bidder firm is
headquartered, and 73% of the mergers have the lawyer of the target firm from the same
state as where the target firm is headquartered.

When we examine the relative size of the two merging firms, we find that the
average target firm is 11.4% of the market capitalization of the bidder firm. We find that
6% of our mergers involved an acquirer that was an international firm that is traded in the
U.S. capital markets. Most of our sample (91%) involve deals that were completed. When
we examine the various industries bidders are from, we find more bidders from hightechnology and health industries. We also find target firms to be more concentrated in
manufacturing, high-technology and health industries. 23

4.2 Determinants of jury waiver clauses
Table 4 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients between the lawyer
reputation variables. All the correlations are significant at the one percent level of
23

Industry characteristics are not reported in Table 2 but are available from the authors.

15

significance. Given that the first two proxy variables, are ranks based on profits per
partner and Vault, they are highly positively correlated; 0.86 for acquirers and 0.82 for
targets, respectively. New York law firms are found to have a higher rank (a lower value
denoting a higher rank; for example, the first ranked law firm gets the value one, the
second ranked law firm gets the value two, and so on). Therefore New York law firms
have a negative correlation with the other lawyer reputation variables. Given the high
correlations between the lawyer reputation proxy variables, we include them separately in
the regressions.
***Table 4***

We now estimate a Probit model to determine the ex ante choice of merger
partners to include a jury waiver clause in their merger agreement. In doing so, we
include a comprehensive list of independent variables in our regression specification, the
results of which are given in Table 5. In column (1), law firm reputation is proxied by the
rank of the law firm based on profits per partner, in column (2) law firm reputation is
proxied by the Vault rank of the law firm, and in column (3) whether the law firm is a
New York law firm. Panel A presents the regression estimates and standard errors which
are corrected using the Huber-White sandwich estimators that control for lack of
normality and heteroscedasticity. For ease of explanation we do not provide the
coefficients on the 18 industry dummy variables. It also turns out that they are not
statistically significant. In Panel B, we present the results of an F-test that the multiple
regression coefficients under the respective hypotheses are jointly equal to zero.

***Table 5***

When we examine the choice of forum and choice of law variables, we find that
merger agreements that showed New York as the forum state and state of governing law
had a higher likelihood of a jury waiver clause. When we examine the restrictive law
states that allow contextual interpretation of contracts we find a negative relationship in
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all three specifications, but this relationship is statistically insignificant. An F-test shows
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the forum state variables are jointly equal to
zero.

We next examine the lawyer reputation variable. In all three specifications, more
reputable law firms of acquirers have a higher likelihood of including a jury waiver
clause in the merger agreement. When the target law firm reputation variable is based on
Vault rankings do more reputable law firms of targets have a higher likelihood of
including a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement. An F-test shows that we can
reject the null hypothesis that the lawyer reputation variables are jointly equal to zero.
These results support the argument that attorneys from more reputable law firms prefer to
have jury waiver clauses in order to reduce the variance in outcomes and errors made by
less knowledgeable juries (as compared to judges). The results are also against the
argument that more reputable law firms prefer juries because they are more confident of
their litigation skill.

We find no evidence for the hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a statistically
significant impact on the probability of having a jury waiver clause in the merger
agreement. These results show no support for lawyers from the same state, or lawyers
that are from the same state where the firm is headquartered having a higher likelihood of
a jury waiver clause. An F-test rejects the null hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a
statistically significant effect on the probability of having a jury waiver clause.

We find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis across all three
regression specifications. A large acquirer taking over a small target firm (Relative size is
low) generates a higher probability of having a jury waiver clause, or conversely, a
merger between equal size firms lowers the probability of having a jury waiver clause.
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We find no evidence that jury waiver clauses are more prevalent when the bidder
is an international firm that is traded on the U.S. stock market. We also find that whether
the deal was completed or not had a statistically insignificant effect on the likelihood of
having a jury waiver clause. Finally, we find statistically insignificant industry effects
that are jointly uncorrelated with the probability of having a jury waiver clause.

We now construct a parsimonious model of the statistically significant variables
that we found in Table 5, for modeling the choice of having a jury waiver clause. The
results of this model are given in Table 6. Consistent with the results noted above, we
find that merger partners who specify New York as the governing law and forum state,
who are represented by high reputation law firms, and are unequal size merger partners,
increase the probability of having a jury waiver clause. These results show strong support
for the choice of forum and law, the lawyer reputation, and bargaining power hypotheses.

***Table 6***

Although we removed all mergers wherein Delaware was chosen as the choice of
forum and law, we examine whether other states have Chancery courts that sit without a
jury. We find five other states that have such courts. These states are Arkansas, Illinois,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee, respectively. We find 14 mergers whose choice
of forum and law is from these states. In Table 7, we repeat our regressions excluding
these 14 observations and find no significant change in our results.

***Table 7***

In summary, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state
and as governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has
such an effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely
to include a jury waiver clause, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law
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firm than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining
power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely
to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that
lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of
having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.

5. Conclusions
This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals over an 11-year
period (2001 to 2011) to determine the ex ante choice to include a jury waiver clause in a
merger and acquisition deal. We extend and improve on the EM study. We find that jury
waiver clauses are quite common in merger agreements with 48.2% (133) of the deals
having such a clause.

We find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state and as
governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an
effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely to
include a jury waiver clause, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law firm
than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power
hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to
include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that
lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of
having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.

The most significant finding is that jury waiver clauses are positvely correlated
with the choice of New York as the governing law and New York as the forum state.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that parties choose jury waiver clauses
inorder to reduce the back end costs of litigation, especially the costs of contract

19

interpretation disputes. As noted above, New York follows the traditional, textualist
approach to contract interpretation (Schwartz & Scott 2010). Textualist interpretation
permits legally sophisticated commercial parties to economize on contracting costs by
shifting costs from the back end of the contracting process (the enforcement function)
where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front end of the contracting
process (the negotiating and design function) where the parties specify the extent to
which context will count. 24 Parties can do this, for example, by drafting a merger clause
that integrates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the written
contract and then having the court apply a plain meaning interpretation to those contract
terms that are facially unambiguous.

Importantly, when parties fully integrate the

agreement and use a merger clause, an interpretation dispute over contract terms may be
resolved on summary judgment, thereby substantially reducing ex post enforcement costs
(Schwartz & Scott 2010).

The reduction in the chance of an expensive trial, in turn, reduces the settlement
value of a claim, and therefore the incentive for a disappointed party to pursue
opportunistic litigation in the first place.

If instead a court decides to consider additional context evidence, it must
necessarily deny a motion for summary judgment and set the case for full trial on the
merits. Thus, if litigation cost is considered, there is a strong argument that in cases
where uncertainty is low and risks can be allocated in advance, many legally
sophisticated commercial parties prefer textualist interpretation so that disputes can be
resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial and the skewed incentives that derive
from the anticipation of these costs (Schwartz & Scott 2010). Such parties will rationally
24

For a discussion of how contracting parties can economize on total contracting costs by shifting costs
between the drafting or front end of the contracting process and the adjudication or back end of the process,
see Scott and Triantis, 2006.
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invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure that a court interpreting the written document
together with the pleadings and briefs will be able to arrive at the “correct interpretation”
more often than not. 25 Here the simple comparison is between the costs of drafting and
the costs of a trial. A jury waiver clause is an additional element in this strategy. Should
a New York court deny the defendant’s claim for summary judgment (say, for example,
on the ground that the contract language is ambiguous), the trial will proceed without a
jury thereby reducing, by some margin, total litigation costs.

The finding that jury waivers are positively correlated with New York as the
choice of law and forum is also consistent with the hypothesis that New York, as the
largest jurisdiction for commercial litigation in the United States, has a core of trial
judges that, on average, have greater expertise in resolving commercial disputes. The
absence of a similar correlation in the case of Delaware, another prominent textualist
jurisdiction with an expert judiciary, is explained by the fact that the jury issue is moot in
that jurisdiction. Indeed, our finding that Delaware is the dominant choice among merger
partners to govern both law and forum supports the efficient cost shifting hypothesis
since Delaware is a textualist jurisdiction with rules of interpretation similar to those in
New York. 26

25

This argument is premised on the claim that firms behave as if they are risk neutral. Assume, for
example, that there is a distribution of possible judicial interpretations of a particular contract. A risk
neutral party wants the mean of this distribution to be at the correct interpretation; that is, for the court to be
right “on average.” Thus, risk neutral firms prefer to limit enforcement costs—say by resolving
interpretation disputes by summary judgment—so long as the courts interpretations are correct on average.
It follows that sophisticated parties (i.e., firms) are more reluctant to expend resources to shrink the
variance around the correct mean. Conditional on the quality of the court, variance falls as more evidence
is introduced. Thus, such parties prefer to limit the evidence that is introduced in litigation. See Schwartz
and Scott, 2003, 2010.
26

Pellaton v. Bank of New York, 592 A.2d 473 (Del. 1991) (if the instrument is clear and unambiguous on
its face, neither this Court nor the trial court may consider parol evidence “to interpret it or search for the
parties’ intent [ions]….”) (quoting Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 339, 343 (1983))
See Schwartz & Scott 2010.
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The inference that jury waivers are linked to the design choice to shift contracting
costs from the enforcement stage to the negotiation stage is also consistent with the
finding that jury waivers are positively correlated with more experienced merger
attorneys with larger reputations. More reputable firms are likely to employ transactional
lawyers who are more familiar with the differences between textualist and contextualist
jurisdictions and thus are better able to advise clients of the efficiency benefits of
choosing New York as the governing law and forum together with a jury waiver
provision.

This is consistent with the finding that the positive correlation between law firm
reputation and jury waivers is driven by New York law firms. In addition, the capacity of
a lawyer to mount sophisticated legal arguments that are more likely to persuade a judge
during a bench trial is increasing in the lawyer’s skill and experience and thus increasing
in the reputation of the law firm. Additional support for this inference is provided by the
finding that jury waiver clauses are positively correlated with a large acquirer taking over
a smaller target. The relative size of the acquirer is increasing in its ability, ceteris
paribus, to bargain for a jury waiver clause both for efficiency reasons and also to negate
any distributional advantage that might attend a small target’s ability to persuade a jury
that they were exploited by the large acquirer in the merger agreement.
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Table 1: Sample Creation
Sample Creation

# of observations

U.S. domestic mergers from SDC (2001-2011)

109,098

No stock return data from CRSP

(100,610)

Initial Sample

8,488

Dropped if acquirer name equal to target name (exchange offer or “buyback”)

(6,681)

Dropped if the form is not “merger” (. equity carve outs, loan modifications and
recapitalizations

(281)

)

Dropped if the merger is not filed with the SEC

(268)

Dropped if the merger does not have a merger agreement

(351)

Dropped mergers wherein forum clause is Delaware

(603)

Dropped mergers wherein relative size cannot be calculated because of missing data

(28)

Final Sample

276
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Table 2: Definitions and Sources for Independent Variables

Variable

Definition {Source}

Forum-NY

Dummy variable set to unity if choice of forum is New York, and zero
otherwise. {Merger agreement}

Forum-restrictive

Dummy variable set to unity if choice of forum is either Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, or
Washington, and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement}

A_reputation_PPP

Rank based on profits per partner for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Rank goes
from high reputation [1], to low reputation [200]. If the law firm is not ranked
we give it a rank of 201. {Merger agreement and Am Law 200 series}

T_reputation_PPP

Rank based on profits per partner for the target firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from
high reputation [1], to low reputation [200]. If the law firm is not ranked we
give it a rank of 201. {Merger agreement and Am Law 200 series}

A_reputation_Vault

Rank based on Vault for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from high
reputation [1], to low reputation [100]. If the law firm is not ranked we give it a
rank of 101. {Merger agreement and Vault 100 series}

T_reputation_Vault

Rank based on Vault for the target firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from high
reputation [1], to low reputation [100]. If the law firm is not ranked we give it a
rank of 101. {Merger agreement and Vault 100 series}

A_reputation_NY

Dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s lawyer is from New York,
and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement}

T_reputation_NY

Dummy variable set to unity if the target firm’s lawyer is from New York, and
zero otherwise. {Merger agreement}

Lawyer familiarity

Dummy variable set to unity if attorneys for both the target and acquirer firm
are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement}

A_ HQ-lawyer familiarity

Dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s headquarters and the
acquiring firm’s attorney are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger
agreement}

T_ HQ-lawyer familiarity

Dummy variable set to unity if the target firm’s headquarters and the target
firm’s attorney are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger
agreement}

Relative size

Natural logarithm of target’s market value less natural logarithm of acquirer’s
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market value. {CRSP}
A_ international

Dummy variable set to unity if bidder is an international acquirer, and zero
otherwise. {SDC}

Completed

Dummy variable set to unity if merger completed, and zero otherwise. {SDC}
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Forum-NY

0.25

0

0.43

Forum-restrictive

0.17

0

0.38

A_reputation _PPP

101.85

83

80.76

T_reputation _PPP

115.25

120

76.80

A_reputation_Vault

63.85

89

41.14

T_reputation_Vault

69.07

97

38.26

A_reputation_NY

0.31

0

0.46

T_reputation_NY

0.18

0

0.39

Lawyer familiarity

0.32

0

0.47

A_HQ- lawyer familiarity

0.84

1

0.37

T_HQ- lawyer familiarity

0.73

1

0.45

Relative size

-2.17

-2.06

1.58

A_international

0.06

0

0.23

Completed

0.92

1

0.27

See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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Table 4: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Lawyer Reputation Variables

A_Reputation_Vault

A_reputation_NY

A_reputation _PPP

0.864

-0.572

A_reputation _NY

-0.608

T_Reputation_Vault

T_reputation_NY

T_reputation _PPP

0.824

-0.535

T_reputation _NY

-0.560

See Table 2 for variable definitions. All Spearman correlations are statistically significant at the onepercent level.
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Table 5: Probit Model for Choice of Jury Waiver Clause
Reputation proxied by:
Ranking of profits-

Ranking of Vault

Dummy for NY law

per-partner

Magazine

firm

(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors

Forum-NY

0.312 (0.10)a

0.322 (0.10)a

0.302 (0.10)a

Forum-restrictive

-0.143 (0.11)

-0.136 (0.11)

-0.103 (0.10)

A_reputation _PPP

-0.002 (0.000)a

T_reputation _PPP

-0.001 (0.001)

A_reputation_Vault

-0.003 (0.001)a

T_reputation_Vault

-0.002 (0.001)b

A_reputation_NY

0.258 (0.10)a

T_reputation_NY

0.214 (0.11)

Lawyer familiarity

-0.107 (0.08)

-0.153 (0.08)

-0.141 (0.09)

A_HQ-lawyer familiarity

0.030 (0.11)

0.037 (0.11)

-0.003 (0.11)

T_HQ-lawyer familiarity

-0.142 (0.09)

-0.155 (0.09)

-0.160 (0.09)

Relative Size

-0.080 (0.03)a

-0.083 (0.03)a

-0.066 (0.03)a

A_international

0.362 (0.21)

0.382 (0.21)

0.362 (0.20)

Completed

0.074 (0.14)

0.067 (0.15)

0.032 (0.14)

constant

0.023 (0.54)

0.284 (0.57)

-0.792 (0.48)

Panel B: p-values for variables jointly equal to zero

Forum

0.001a

0.001a

0.003b

Attorney reputation

0.000a

0.000a

0.001a

Lawyer familiarity

0.166

0.062

0.083

Industry effects

0.192

0.143

0.051

Pseudo R2

0.312

0.313

0.297

276

276

276

N
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See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. For each regression
specification, 18 industry dummies are included for acquirers and targets (nine each), the results of which are
not reported. a statistically significant at 1% level; b statistically significant at 5% level.
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Table 6: Parsimonious Probit Model of Statistically Significant Variables (in Table 5)
Reputation proxied by:
Ranking of profits-

Ranking of Vault

Dummy for NY law

per-partner

Magazine

firm

(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors

Forum-NY

A_reputation _PPP

0.382 (0.08)a

0.366 (0.08)a

0.369 (0.09)a

-0.002 (0.000)a

A_reputation_Vault

-0.003 (0.000)a

T_reputation_Vault

-0.003 (0.001)a
0.330 (0.08)a

A_reputation_NY

Relative Size

-0.066 (0.02)a

-0.073 (0.02)a

-0.063 (0.02)a

constant

-0.062 (0.19)

0.293 (0.23)

-0.845 (0.16)

0.200

0.208

0.178

276

276

276

Pseudo R2
N

See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. a statistically
significant at 1% level; b statistically significant at 5% level.
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Table 7: Removing States with Chancery Courts (AR, IL, MS, NJ, and TN)
Reputation proxied by:
Ranking of profits-

Ranking of Vault

Dummy for NY law

per-partner

Magazine

firm

(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors

Forum-NY

A_reputation _PPP

0.385 (0.08)a

0.367 (0.09)a

0.362 (0.09)a

-0.002 (0.000)a

A_reputation_Vault

-0.003 (0.000)a

T_reputation_Vault

-0.003 (0.001)a
0.353 (0.08)a

A_reputation_NY

Relative Size

-0.069 (0.03)a

-0.078 (0.02)a

-0.069 (0.02)a

constant

-0.081 (0.19)

0.301 (0.24)

-0.881 (0.17)

0.204

0.216

0.188

262

262

262

Pseudo R2
N

See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. a statistically
significant at 1% level; b statistically significant at 5% level.
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